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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Joseph M. Wisden,
Plaintiff / Appellant,

Court of Appeals No. 950486
Supreme Court No.
950237

v.
Warren J. Granville,
Priority 415
Defendant / Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE WARREN J. GRANVILLE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal was taken from a grant of Summary Judgment, in
favor of the Defendant/Appellee, Warren J. Granville, on May 2,
1995.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 73-2-2 (Supp. 1994), the

Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter.
This matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for
disposition, pursuant to the authority of the Utah Supreme Court.
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (K) .

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
Plaintiff Joseph Wisden ("Wisden") presents two issues on
appeal.
The first issue is whether the district court correctlv
granted summary judgment on Wisden's claim for False Arrest
against Warren J. Granville, an Assistant Attorney General for
Sn.^P
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activity a: issue arose our of Granville's prosecution of Wisden
in Arizona.
The second issue is whether the district court correctly
granted summary judgment on Wisden's claim of fraud when he
failed to present a prima facia case in support of this claim.

STANDARDS 0? APPELLATE REVIEW
A lower court's determination that a grant of Summary
Judgment is appropriate is reviewed de novo

and "for correctness

without deference to the trial cSurt's ruling."

Peterson v.

Board of Education, 855 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1992).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue before the
Court is contained in the body of this brief, or is set forth in
the Wisden's Opening Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedincs Below
Wisden brought suit on February 1, 1994, in the Fifth

Judicial Court in Saint George, Utah, alleging that Defendant
Warren J. Granville intentionally caused improper process to
issue, resulting in Wisden's arrest, incarceration, extradition
from Utah to Arizona, and criminal conviction in Arizona.
(Record, p.i, Complaint.)

These events arose from the indictment

of Wisden on criminal charges for fraud m

the Stare cf Arizona.

{Record, p.271, Indictment.
After Wisden filed an Amended Complaint (Record, p. 221,
Amended Complaint), the Arizona Attorney General's Office moved
for summary judgment, on behalf cf. Granville, based on absolute
prosecutorial immunity.
Summary Judgment.)

At or about the same time, Wisden also moved

for summary judgment.
Summary Judgment.)

(Record, p.27, Defendant's Motion for

(Record, p.413, Plaintiff's Motion for

The district court held a hearing on the

issues raised in both summary judgment motions.
Hearing on Motions for Summary Judgment.)

(Record, p.455/

On April 6, 1995, the

district court, by memorandum decision, ordered Summary Judgment
in favor of Defendant, Warren J. Granville.

(Record, p.4 63,

Memorandum Decision; Record, p.457, Order.)
Wisden filed a Notice of Appeal, on May 30, 1995.
p.479, Notice of Appeal.)

(Record,

This case was transferred, for

disposition by the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to an order by
the Utah Supreme Court dated August 2, 1995.

3.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On December 15, 1988, in the Arizona Superior Court in and

for the County of Maricopa County, Arizona, an Arizona grand jury
indicted Joseph Michael Wisden (Plaintiff) for thirteen Felony
_

it

counts or Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices, one Felony count of
Attempted Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices, and one Felony count
of Illegal Enterprise. (Record, p.3, Complaint; Record, p.271,

Indictment.

On January 13, 1933, the Honorable Judge 0'Toole of

the Maricopa County (Arizona) Superior Court issued a warrant for
Wisden's arrest.

(Record, p.15, Warrant for Arrest.)

On August 23, 1990, the Washington County, Utah, Sheriff's
Department arrested Wisden, and the Washington County Attorney
filed a Fugitive Complaint.
No.5010012 33 . y

(Record, p.300, Fugitive Complaint

The State of Arizona, relying upon Wisden's

statements that he would appear voluntarily, did not seek
extradition.

(Record, p.334, Affidavit of Warren J. Granville.;

Instead, Wisden was allowed to post bail.
*V*QT^

custod**7".

He then was released

(Id. ^

When Wisden failed to appear in Arizona as he had promised,
Arizona authorities contacted the police in Hurricane City, Utah.
Cn February 15, 1991, Utah authorities arrested Wisden again, and
a second Fugitive Complaint was filed.
Complaint No.911000305.)

(Record, p.305, Fugitive

On March 6, 1991, the Honorable Judge

Shumate of the Circuit Court in and for Washington County, Utah,
dismissed the first Fugitive Complaint.

(Record, p.3 07, Order of

Dismissal.}
On March 14, 13 91, the Governor of Arizona, Fife Symington,
issued a Governor's Warrant for the extradition of the Plaintiff.
[Record p.312, Arizona Governor's Warrant.;

However, on March

21, 1991, before the Extradition Warrant was received by the Utah
authorities, the Plaintiff requested and was granted a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.

Plaintiff was again released from all restraints

imposed by the courts of Utah in the County of Washington.

[Record p.3 08, Order - Habeas Corpus.)
On August 26, 1991, pursuant to the outstanding extradition
warrant, a Utah Governor's Warrant was served upon the Plaintiff.
(Record p.313, Utah Governor's Warrant.)

Finally, on September

6, 1991, the Plaintiff was remanded to the custody of the State
cf Arizona.

At that time, the original arrest warrant was

executed by the Maricopa County (Arizona) Sheriff's Office.
(Record p.2 82, Warrant for Arrest.)
On February 18, 1992, a judge found Wisden guilty on 5
Felony counts of Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices, and 1 Felony
count of Illegally Conducting an Enterprise in Maricopa County,
Arizona, Criminal Cause no. 88-11353.
Dated 2-18-92.)

(Record p.324, Minutes

The judge placed Wisden on probation for seven

years and ordered him to pay restitution in the total amount of
$33,895.10.

(Records p.335, Standard Terms of Probation.)

Wisden appealed this decision, challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed both the

criminal conviction and the sentences.

(Records p.336,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Wisden's first allegation, that Prosecutor Granville's
actions constituted false arrest, was properly rejected on the
ground of absolute immunity.

When a prosecutor takes action

pursuant to his duties, public policy and common law properly
protect him from any civil lawsuit, frivolous or not.
w
D

Without

this protection, prosecutors would be subject to harassing
litigation by those, like Wisden, who are pursued by state
authorities for their criminal acts.
The allegations here stem from Granville's legal attempts to
secure Wisden's presence before an Arizona court to answer a
criminal indictment.

Despite Wisden's efforts to avoid facing

charges, Granville eventually succeeded in securing Wisden's
arrest and extradition to the Arizona courts, where the criminal
justice system made Wisden answer for his crimes.
At all relevant times, Granville acted pursuant to his
authority as a prosecutor for the Arizona Attorney General's
Office to make Wisden available for prosecution.

"If prosecutors

are concerned with possible liability when they take the steps
necessary to make a defendant available for prosecution, the
decision whether or not to prosecute may be directly affected.
And that is precisely the type of concern that absolute immunity
seeks to foreclose."

Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 ?.3d 1139,

1150 (2d Cir. 1995) .

Warren J. Granville is entitled to

absolute immunitv.
The district court also properly rejected Wisden's second
assertion that Granville's actions constituted Fraud.

Wisden's

claim is based upon his inaccurate characterization of the arrest
and extradition process.

When an outstanding arrest warrant

exists from a foreign jurisdiction, local authorities have
probable cause to arrest the subject.

Even without a warrant,

the suspect can be taken into custody while the other state
c

institutes extradition proceedings.

The outstanding warrant is

not extinguished by an arrest, but remains in effect until the
subject is in the custody of the jurisdiction that issued the
warrant.

Wisden's claim, that he was arrested under an expired

warrant, is wrong.
Moreover, Wisden's argument, that Pace v. Parrish, 2 74 P. 2d
273 (Utah 1552), should be expanded to fit the facts of this
case, has no factual or legal merit.
the requirements for a prima

facia

Pace clearly establishes

showing of fraud.

Wisden

cannot establish the majority of the elements necessary to state
a fraud claim.

Furthermore, there is no basis in statute or case

law for his assertion that fraud can be perpetuated vicariously
through a third party's reliance on fraudulent
misrepresentations.

Because there is no basis for Wisden's fraud

claim, this Court should affirm the lower court's summary
judgment for Granville.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT GRANVILLE'S ACTS
WERE TAKEN PURSUANT TO HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
THEREBY ESTABLISHING A COMPLETE DEFENSE BASED UPON
ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY.
The principle cf prosecutorial immunity dates back to the
old English common law.

The Supreme Court traced the history of

this principle in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 4C9, 96 S. Ct. 984
(1976).

Prosecutorial immunity is "oredicated upon a considered
7

inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant
official and the interests behind it."
390.

.Id. at 422, 96 S. Ct. at

These interests include "concern that harassment by

unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor'
energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he
would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence
of judgment required by his public trust."
at 991.

Id.

at 424, 96 S. Ct

The Supreme Court found that these interests would not

be adequately served by qualified immunity and, therefore,
concluded that prosecutors must Be afforded absolute immunity.
The Court reached this conclusion despite the realization
that "such immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant
without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or
dishonest action deprives him of liberty."
at 993.

Ici. at 427, 96 S. Ct

To temper the onerous effect of its holding, the Court

explicitly delineated the boundaries of the available immunity,
limiting it to activities that are an "integral part of the
judicial process."

Id. at 431, 96 S. Ct. at 995.

The Supreme

^ourt" concluded tha*~ absolute immunity ^rcoeriv extends to
prosecutors "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
state's case . . . ."

Id. at 432, 96 S. Ct. at 995.

Subsequent decisions have struggled to identify when a
prosecutor is acting as an advocate, as an administrator, or as
an investigator.

As a result, courts have determined that if a

prosecutor's actions "are encompassed within 'the preparation
necessary to present a case,

[they] are immunized as involving

the crcsecutDr's advocacv functions. "

Rose v. Bartle

3 72. F.2d

331, 334 (1389), (citing, Mevers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1449
(8th Cir.), cert, denied, 108 S. Ct. 97 (1987)).
Here, Wisden argued below that the trial court
allegedly failed to follow one segment of the holding of Weathers
v, Sbert, 505 ?.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1974), that " [m]aking an
arrest is a police function, not a judicial one . . . ."
However, in making this argument, Wisden fails to recognize the
important distinction between simply ostaimnc authorization for
an arrest and actually making the arrest.

While physically

taking someone into custody is a police function, obtaining the
legal authorization to do so fails within the ambit of advocacy.
Wisden has focused erroneously on the arrest, when the true issue
he raises about the prosecutor's actions concerns the validitv of
the arrest warrant, at the time it was served.
Securing an uncooperative criminal defendant's presence and
requiring him to answer legitimate charges that have been brought
against him in another state is a necessary step in the
prosecution of a criminal case.

Warren Granville, as the

prosecutor, merely requested the entry of a valid felony arrest
warrant into the computers of the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC).

Wisden's extradition from Utan was a required

element of the initiation of Arizona's prosecution of Wisden.1
1

When he was arrested in Utah, Wisden instituted a series
of tactics designed to delay his return to Arizona. He initially
agreed to waive extradition and appear voluntarily, but failed to
honor his promise. Wnen Wisden failed to appear, the warrant was
again entered into the NCIC computer. Wisden was rearrested and
9

Contrary to Wisden's assertions, M[o]ne of the most
important duties of a prosecutor pursuing a criminal proceeding
is to ensure [the] defendants . . . .

presen[ce] at trial."

Ehrlich v. Guliani. 910 F.2d 1220, 1223 (4th Cir. 1990).

"If

prosecutors are concerned with possible liability when tney take
seeps necessary to make a defendant available for prosecution,
the decision whether or not to prosecute may be direcnly
effected.

And that is precisely the type of concern that

absolute immunity seeks to foreclose."

Pinaud. 52 F.3d at 1150.

Wisden's only other argument is based on dicta contained in
a footnote of a concurring opinion in Imbler, 424 U.S. at 441
n.6, 96 S. Ct. at 1000 n.6.

In that footnote, Justice White,

joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, explained that the
majority's opinion appeared to unnecessarily expand absolute
prosecutorial immunity.

The three Justices expressed concern

that a broadly interpreted absolute prosecutorial privilege would
foreclose legitimate actions for intentional constitutional
violations, especially subornation of perjury and the withholding
of exculpatory evidence.

However, the dissent conceded that even

where "the prosecutor's decision to prosecute was malicious and
without probable cause - at least where there is no independent
allegation that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory information
. . the judicial process is better served by absolute immunity
than by any other rule."

Imoler, 424 U.S. at 43 8, 96 S.Ct. at

the extradition proceedings were instituted.
Affidavit of Warren Granville.)

(Record p.33,

999.

Under this standard, the court below correctly granted

summary j udgmenu.

Point 2.
WISDEN'S ASSERTION THAT THE PARAMETERS OF PACE V.
PARISH SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO FIT THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE, HAS NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL MERIT. FURTHER, THERE IS
NO LEGAL BASIS FOR WISDEN'S ASSERTION THAT FRAUD CAN BE
PERPETUATED VICARIOUSLY VIA THE ACTS OF GOVERNMENT
AGENTS.
Wisden's second issue alleges that Warren Granville
committed fraud by requesting that an executed arrest warrant be
entered into the NCIC computer.

However, the arrest warrant

issued by the Superior Court of the State of Arizona remained
valid until Arizona secured custody of Wisden.

The trial court,

therefore, properly rejected this theory of liability.
"The general rule of law in this situation is that a warrant
of arrest issued in one state can not be executed outside the
boundary of the issuing state. . . . [However] where an officer
of the non-issuing state has knowledge of the warrant, probable
cause exists for the arrest in that state."

State v. Everett,

110 Ariz. 429, 431, 520 P.2d 301 (1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S.
83C (1974) (citations emitted;.

The mere existence of a felony

aires: warrant from another jurisdiction constitutes probable
cause for arrest without a warrant,

After taking a fleeing felon

into custody, the arresting authority may hold the felon for a
reasonable time to allow the state that issued the warrant to
institute extradition proceedings.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-3 0-14

and 77-3 0-15 (Uniform Extradition Act).

Wisden's claim that the Arizona arrest warrant was executed
at the time of his initial arrest, and was therefore invalid at
the time of his second arrest, is erroneous.

Here, each time

Utah authorities took Wisden into custody, it constituted an
arrest without a warrant.

The Utah authorities acted on

information from the NCIC computer because Arizona had an
outstanding arrest warrant for Wisden.

This action was

consistent with the Uniform Extradition Act.

id.

Throughout the

events in question, the Arizona warrant remained valid.
Prosecutor Granville could not commit fraud because the warrant,
entered into the NCIC computer, remained valid.
Additionally, there is no legal basis for Wisden's assertion
that he was the victim of "fraud by proxy."
action exists.2

No such cause of

The only theory Wisden offers on this point is

his suggestion that the concept of agency can be expanded to
cover the present situation.

Under this theory, Wisden would

hold Granville responsible for the allegedly fraudulent acts of
Utah law enforcement officials.

However, there is simply no

basis for this proposition under statute or case law.
Furthermore, even if Wisden's theory were viable, he

would

still be required to present a prima facia case for fraud.
,?

The

[e] lements of actionable fraud to be proved are a false

representation of existing material fact, made knowingly or
recklessly, for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon, upon

2

Wisden's claim that he was unable to research this point
is irrelevant to this proceeding.
12

which plaintiff reasonable relies to his injury."
Parrish, 274 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952).

Pace v.

Wisden has failed to offer

the trial court any evidence that there was a knowing or reckless
false misrepresentation of fact, by Warren Granville or anyone
else.

To do so, Plaintiff would i^eed to offer proof that the

arrest warrant was invalid, that the party knew that the arrest
warrant was invalid, and that the party chose to pursue the
warrant anyway.

Further, Wisden would have to show that the

party intended to induce Wisden's reliance on the fraudulent
misrepresentations.

Finally, Wisden would have to show that he

suffered injury.
Wisden did not — and cannot—meet any of these requirements.
First, the warrant remained valid at all times.

Second, neither

Warren Granville, nor anyone else, intended to induce or actually
induced any action by Wisden.
'injury.7

Finally, Wisden did not suffer

Any detriment that resulted from Wisden's appearance

before the Arizona court was the result of his own criminal
behavior, not any sinister scheme concocted by Warren Granville
and Utah's law enforcement officials.
Wisden's fraud claim has no merit.

The summary judgment in

favor of Warren Granville should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The district court's decision, to grant summary judgment to
Warren Granville, should be affirmed.

Because of the frivolous

nature of the case, Appellee Warren Granville respectfully
1 *5

requests attorney's fees for this appeal
Dated this U.y day of October, 1995

GRANT WOODS
Arizona Attorney General
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^
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y Assistant Attorney General
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Warren J. Granville
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